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We use a unique survey of the EU labor force to investigate the relationship between occupational licensing
and the gender wage gap. We find that the gender wage gap is canceled for licensed self-employed workers.
However, this closure of the gender wage gap is not mirrored by significant changes in the gender gap in
hours worked. Our results are robust using decomposition methods, quantile regressions, different datasets,
and selection correction.
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1. Introduction
Gender wage gaps have been a prominent theme within academic and policy debates for many decades.
Despite some recent convergence in the earnings of men and women, the question remains as to what kind
of policies are effective in closing the gap (Blau and Kahn 2017; Goldin 2014a; Olivetti and Petrongolo
2008; Blau and Kahn 2000). The role of the institutional context, including equal pay legislation, national
minimum wages, unionisation and childcare subsidies, has been shown to go some way in correcting gender
pay disparities. Goldin (2014b) has also suggested that the credentialisation of certain occupations through
occupational licensing could reduce wage discrimination, but empirical evidence has been lacking so far.
Occupational licensing regulates the legal requirements for legally working in specific occupations. It
is one of the most common forms of regulation in the labor market. In the European Union, occupa-
tional licensing directly affects 22 percent of workers (Koumenta and Pagliero 2019). Common examples
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of licensed occupations include medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists, lawyers, architects, engineers, hair-
dressers, electricians and plumbers. The prevalence of licensing is similarly high in the US where, depend-
ing on the data source, it is estimated that between 20 and 29 percent of workers are licensed (Kleiner and
Krueger 2010, 2013; Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2017).
There are three main channels through which occupational licensing may affect the gender wage gap.
First, licensing typically imposes minimum human capital requirements for legally working in a profession.
If the cost of meeting these requirements differs by gender, human capital accumulation may be differ-
entially affected and gender disparities in labor market outcomes may increase (or be reduced). Second,
by standardizing the human capital requirements for entry into a profession, licensing can correct for the
information asymmetry associated with statistical discrimination. Third, occupational licensing generally
requires passing a professional exam administered by a professional association or licensing board. If the
process of obtaining a license is discriminatory, then occupational licensing regulations may provide more
opportunities to one group of workers and contribute to the creation of gender differences. In spite of the
potential importance of licensing in determining gender differences, there is currently no evidence on the
role played by occupational licensing in determining gender differences, let alone on the relevance of these
three specific channels.
In this paper, we provide the first systematic evidence on the relation between occupational licensing and
gender wage gaps in the labor market. We also compare our results on licensing with those on certification,
unionization, type of employment (employee versus self-employed), and other individual characteristics,
such as educational attainment and type of occupation, which have been found to partially explain the
wage gender gap. Our analysis is based on the European Union Survey of Occupational Regulation, a
unique dataset covering the EU workforce that allows us to use a self-reported measure of occupational
licensing, certification and unionization, as well as wages, hours worked, and other individual characteristics
commonly observable in labor force surveys.
Our main results are as follows. First, using classic wage regressions, we find that the gender gap is
about 16 percent on average for all workers, whereas it is completely canceled for self-employed licensed
workers. For unionized employees we find a partial reduction in the wage gap, which remains at about
10 percent. Second, using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, we find that the explained component of the
gap is small.1 Still, gender differences in the proportion of licensed workers explain about 0.3 percentage
points (2%) of the wage gap.2 This is because there is a wage premium associated with licensing, and
licensing is more prevalent among men. However, the wage structure effect (the unexplained component)
1This is consistent with the literature. For instance, in a meta-analysis, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) show that
more than 2/3 of the wage gap is attributed to the unexplained component in many of the more than 200 studies with data from the
1980s and 1990s.
2In relative terms, this is about 27% of the component of the wage gap explained by occupation fixed effects.
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of licensing amounts to -0.5 percentage points (-3%) of the wage gap. This negative effect reflects the
closure of the gender wage gap for licensed self-employed workers. Although the total effect is negative,
the decomposition results point towards an ambiguous role of licensing in explaining overall gender wage
differences.
With respect to other institutions, we find that certification explains 0.1 percentage points, while union-
ization -0.2 percentage points. Third, using quantile regressions, we find that our main results are robust
throughout the wage distribution. However, the licensing premium increases when moving towards higher
quantiles in the wage distribution. A similar effect occurs for the certification premium, whereas unioniza-
tion seems to be more beneficial at lower wages. Fourth, the closure of the gender wage gap observed for
self-employed licensed workers is not mirrored by significant changes in the gender gap in hours worked.
Finally, we find that our results are robust to sensitivity checks. Using two different datasets, namely
the Skills and Employment Survey for the UK and the Socio-Economic Panel for Germany, we are able to
replicate our main findings. This suggests that our results are not driven by specific features of how our data
are collected or how occupational licensing is measured in our main dataset. We also show that our results
are robust when accounting for selection into self-employment.
Although our results are descriptive and cannot be interpreted as causal, they are important for three
main reasons. First, they highlight occupational licensing as a possible new determinant of the wage gap,
neglected until now in the literature on gender wage differentials. Second, they provide the first evidence
that licensing might have an important quantitative effect, possibly together with other variables describing
labor market institutions and the type of work arrangement (employee versus self-employed). Finally, they
suggest that licensing operates very differently from other labor market institutions such as unions.
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and results. We discuss sensitivity of the results to different data
sources and measures of licensing as well as selection on unobservables in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
Licensing defines the minimum human capital requirements for legally working in a profession. These may
be in the form of educational qualifications, work experience and the passing of an exam. Certification is
less restrictive in that it imposes no restrictions on the right to practice a profession, but allows individuals
to voluntarily apply to be certified as meeting the standards of a professional or regulatory body. The wage
effects of licensing are well-documented in the literature. Studies have consistently shown that licensing
is associated with a wage premium ranging from 3-18% in the US depending on the data source (Kleiner
and Krueger 2010, 2013; Gittleman and Kleiner 2016; Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2017), 4% in the European
context (Koumenta and Pagliero 2019), between 8-11% in Germany (Bol and Weeden 2014) and between
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9-19% in the UK depending on the occupational group (Koumenta et al. 2014). The precise mechanism that
may account for the observed wage premium is less clear. From a human capital perspective, if licensing
were not mandatory, the wage premium associated with it would reflect returns to education. However, if
licensing increases the skills equilibrium within the occupation and keeps less competent practitioners out
of the market, it may also reflect monopoly rents accruing to insiders as a result of labor supply restrictions
into the occupation.
Turning to gender wage gaps, economists have commonly sought to explain gender wage disparities
by examining gender differences in human capital and occupational choices (Mincer and Polachek 1974;
Polachek 1981), with the unexplained residual being attributed to discrimination. Within this literature, hu-
man capital theory attributes the wage penalty to women acquiring less formal education and training and
choosing occupations that require low occupation-specific investments in skills. Labor market discrimina-
tion approaches instead locate the female disadvantage in models of statistical discrimination assumed to be
the outcome of imperfect means of observing productivity (Blau and Kahn 2017; Altonji and Blank 1999).
Against the backdrop of this literature, our starting point is that the economic and legal arrangements
governing occupations affect occupational wage differentials and the structure of earnings (Koumenta and
Pagliero 2019; Kleiner and Krueger 2010; Card 2001; Gittleman et al. 2018). Any rents or higher returns
to education accruing to licensed occupations may thus impact the relative wages of men and women if
these groups differ in their capacity to access these occupations. Such barriers to entry could be artificial,
for example in the form of discriminatory practices by those controlling the licensing process, or they could
arise from differences in ability between the two groups.
Our interest in whether licensing affects the gender wage gap is further motivated by its signaling prop-
erties. Becoming licensed is a costly endeavor (Carpenter et al. 2018). Typical requirements include ed-
ucation, work experience, and written and practical examinations. Additional costs include application,
processing and licensing fees, and of course the opportunity cost in terms of forgone income while in train-
ing. From a human capital perspective, it follows that a woman entering a licensed occupation is signaling
not only levels of competency analogous to those of her male counterparts, but also similar labour market
commitment as evidenced by these investments. Further, in standard models of statistical discrimination,
pay disparities between men and women arise from the average differences in the expected value of the pro-
ductivity of these two groups or in the accuracy with which productivity can be predicted (Arrow 1973;
Phelps 1972). By standardizing the human capital requirements for entering the occupation, the signaling
properties of licensing in relation to both skills and ability can correct for the information asymmetry prob-
lem associated with statistical discrimination. Goldin (2014b), for example, argues that credentialisation
of occupations might eliminate the negative signal provided by hiring a woman, particularly if the creden-
tial were well-known and verifiable. Some scant evidence of this proposition already exists, though not for
the gender wage gap. Law and Marks (2009) find that licensing reduced the share of women in teaching
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but increased it in other occupations (engineers, pharmacists). Blair and Chung (2018) show that licensed
African-American men have higher wages than their non-licensed counterparts and attribute this to the sig-
naling effect of licensing in relation to non-felony status. Certification can have a similar effect, while the
union’s egalitarian wage policies and pay scales attached to jobs rather than individuals are also expected not
only to put an upward pressure on female wages, but also to limit the scope for employers to discriminate
(Metcalf et al. 2001; Machin 1999). In addition to employer discrimination, licensing may reduce incom-
plete information about self-employed workers and hence consumer discrimination. For instance, Borjas
and Bronars (1989) develop a model of incomplete information that explains why minorities are negatively
selected into self-employment, whereas whites exhibit positive selection.
The licensing literature is largely silent about the effect of licensing on the wages of those in self-
employment both in aggregate and by gender. This is despite self-employment accounting for a sizable
proportion of licensed workers and evidence that the removal of licensing requirements in 53 professions
in Germany increased the propensity to work in self-employment Rostam-Afschar (2014). Therefore, we
put particular focus on how licensing differentially affects the gender wage gap of employees and the self-
employed. In the broader literature on gender pay, there is consensus that the gender wage gap observed
for employees is also evident among the self-employed (Moore 1983; Haber et al. 1987; Sexton and Robin-
son 1989). Moore (1983) formulates testable predictions for employer discrimination: self-employment as
a method of avoiding racist (or sexist) employment practices should result in a higher female/male earn-
ings ratio among self-employed workers than their wage and salary counterparts but cannot find evidence
for it. Hundley (2000), shows that a large part of the gap is due to women being under-represented in
more rewarding areas of self-employed work, such as professional services and trades, and attributes this to
women avoiding entering markets where licensing requirements impose additional hurdles for entry. How-
ever, whether the earnings gap between the two sexes is different when women enter licensed occupations
remains an open question.
3. Data and summary statistics
The European Union Survey of Occupational Regulation (EU-SOR) is specifically designed to capture oc-
cupational regulation. It covers the individuals residing in the 28 EU member states, aged 15 and above.
The survey was carried out by TNS (a market research company) in March and April 2015 by means of
telephone interviews (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews). A total of 26,640 individuals were in-
terviewed providing data on their licensing, certification and trade union membership status. Licensing is
defined as having obtained a license or passed an exam required in addition to education to legally practice a
profession. Certification is defined as having obtained a license or passed an exam, in addition to education,
which is not required to legally practice a profession. We define unionization as being a member of a trade
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union.3 For details, see Table A.1 and Appendix E. Detailed information on a variety of individual charac-
teristics, similar to those commonly included in labor force surveys, was also collected. These include net
wages, hours worked, age, educational attainment, occupation, type of work arrangement (employee versus
self-employed), country of residence, industry in which the firm or organization operates, and its size.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the differences between females and males across the 28 Euro-
pean countries in our sample. Female hourly wages are on average substantially lower than those of their
male counterparts. This difference is statistically significant according to t-tests reported in the right-most
columns. The number of hours worked per month also differs significantly: women work on average over
20 hours less than men. There are also disparities regarding the type of employment. The fraction of self-
employed women is only 11%, while 18% of men are self-employed. The self-employed, who are well
represented in our sample, constitute an important portion of the overall labor force in the EU.4 Female and
male workers are roughly equally attached to the three labor market institutions we study. About 25% of fe-
males and slightly fewer men report being a union member. Licensing covers 21% of women and 22% of
men. Certification is slightly less common, covering 19% of women and 22% of men. A total of 35% of
women and 33% of men are neither licensed, certified, nor union members.
Figure 1a and 1b describe the wage distributions for male and female non-licensed workers. In each,
the distribution for employees and self-employed workers is indicated separately. Figure 1c and 1d show
the wage distributions for licensed workers. The vertical bars represent the mean wage for each group of
workers. In general, licensing is associated with higher wages (the licensing premium, see Koumenta and
Pagliero (2019)). This can be clearly seen comparing Figures 1a and 1b for non-licensed workers with the
corresponding figures for licensed workers (figures 1c and 1d). Self-employment is also associated with
higher wages, which can be seen comparing the vertical bars representing mean wages within each figure.
While this self-employment premium is similar for licensed and non-licensed males (figures 1b and 1d), it
is substantially larger for licensed than for non-licensed females. The large wage premium associated with
female self-employment in licensed occupations is an important and robust empirical regularity that has a
large impact on our results on the gender wage gap described in the following sections.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3Since our focus is on licensing, we do not address here the many issues related to differences in union coverage across occu-
pations and countries.
4Overall, we observe 1,263 self-employed female who represent 11,810,015 individuals (using the sample weights provided by
EU-SOR).
6
4. The Gender Wage Gap
4.1 Wage regressions
In order to describe the mean gender wage gap across labor market institutions (licensing, certification,
and unionization) and type of employment (employees and self-employed workers), we estimate a classic
Mincer (1958) wage regression model,





















+ θo +θn +θc + εionc
where the dependent variable log(wionc) denotes net hourly log-wage of individual i, in occupation o,
industry n, and country c. The vector Xionc includes individual characteristics (age, age2, indicators for 6
levels of education achieved, and the size of the firm or organization in which the individual is working).
The indicator variables Femaleionc and Self-Employedionc are equal to one if the respondent is female
and self-employed respectively. Three indicator variables, Institution(j)ionc, j=1,...3, describe whether the
worker is licensed, certified, or unionized. The model includes all the direct effects and the three-way inter-
actions between Femaleionc, Self-Employedionc, and Institution(j)ionc. Finally, θo, θn, and θc are occupation-,
industry-, and country-specific fixed effects, and εionc captures unobserved determinants of wages.
The coefficients β2, β4, δ j, µ j capture the average gender wage differences across labor market institu-
tions and type of employment. Figure 2 graphically describes our main results based on the OLS estimates
reported in Table B.2. The gender wage gap is measured on the vertical axes (in percent of average male
wage) for employees and for self-employed workers in the two panels, respectively. The figure shows that
for employees who are neither licensed, certified, nor unionized, the predicted gender wage gap is 16.4%,
after controlling for individual characteristics and fixed effects. The gender gap is not significantly different
for licensed and certified workers, while it is substantially lower, about 10%, for unionized workers. Turn-
ing to the self-employed, the gender wage gap is about 20% for all groups of workers, with the remarkable
exception of licensed workers, for whom the wage gap is completely canceled. The point estimate of the
wage gap for self-employed licensed workers in Figure 2 is 2.6% (not significantly different from zero at
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conventional levels). For unionized workers, the standard errors are too large to produce conclusive results,
since few self-employed workers are union members.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Complementing Figure 2, Table B.2 shows that the closure of the wage gap for self-employed licensed
workers is due to significantly higher wages for female workers (not lower wages for males). Using the
results in column IX of Table B.2, the gender gap for these workers (2.6%) can be computed as the sum of
the coefficients of Female -0.164, Female×Licensing -0.006, Female×Self-Employed -0.084, Female×
Self-Employed× Licensing 0.228. Hence, the higher wages for female self-employed licensed workers
compensate for the lower wages that women have on average in the labor market.
Table B.2 also provides five additional insights. First, our estimates of the gender gap are robust to
the inclusion of different sets of regressors in model (1). Including occupation and industry fixed effects
reduces the gap only slightly, and it remains similar regardless of which institution or interaction terms are
included. Overall, our estimates of the gender gap for European workers are in line with those obtained in
the literature (see, e.g. Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). Second,
on average, licensed workers earn about 5% higher wages. This is consistent with a large literature on the
wage effects of occupational licensing (Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2013; Koumenta and Pagliero
2019). Third, certified workers also enjoy a wage premium, although it is lower than that of licensed workers
(Koumenta and Pagliero 2019). Fourth, there is a wage premium for union members, which is significantly
different from zero (about 7%) for female workers alone (Bryson et al. 2020). Fifth, there is a substantial
premium for self-employment (cf. Rostam-Afschar and Strohmaier 2019) of about 17% higher wages for
men and about 9% for women.
4.2 Oaxaca Blinder decompositions
Wage regressions using model (1) constrain some of the coefficients to be the same for male and female
workers. We relax this assumption using a standard Oaxaca-Blinder (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) decom-
position, which requires estimating a linear model similar to (1) separately for the sample of male and female
workers. The decomposition is also interesting as it provides an estimate of the part of the wage gap that
is due to worker characteristics (composition effect or explained component) and the estimated coefficients
(wage structure effect or unexplained component).
We decompose the average wage gap as follows:
∆M−F = [E(XM−XF)]′βPooled (2)
+ [E(XM)′(βPooled−βM)−E(XF)′(βPooled−βF)],
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where ∆M−F denotes the hourly wage differential, E(XM −XF) the average difference in characteris-
tics, which gives the explained component if multiplied by a coefficient vector. The second term is the
unexplained component, commonly attributed to discrimination, but which also includes potential effects of
unobserved variables. Following Neumark (1988), we estimate the coefficients βM, βF, and βPooled from the
sample of males, females, and the pooled sample, respectively. The matrix of regressors X in the decompo-
sition includes the same explanatory variables used in the wage regressions.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The results from the decompositions are presented in Table 2. The top panel shows the mean predicted
wage by group and their difference. In our sample, the mean of the log wages is 1.963 for men and 1.797
for women. The wage gap is 0.166. For each model specification (columns I-IV), the table reports the
total explained and unexplained components and the detailed decomposition for the interaction between the
institution (licensing, certification, and unionisation) and the self-employed dummies. The table also reports
the two components for the other individual characteristics, and the fixed effects.
Overall, the results show that the explained component is small. Going into more detail, column IV
shows that the difference in prevalence of occupational licensing among men and women explains about 0.3
percentage points (2%) of the wage gap.5 Certification explains 0.1 percentage points, and unionization -0.2
percentage points (hence, it “reduces” the wage gap).6 In comparison, individual characteristics explain -1.6
percentage points. Country (2.4%) and industry (1.4%) fixed effects contribute positively to the wage gap,
while occupation fixed effects contribute negatively (-1.1%). Hence, in relative terms, the part of the wage
gap explained by licensing is about 19% of that of the individual characteristics included in the model or
about 27% of that of occupation fixed effects.
The unexplained components (due to differences in estimated coefficients) are generally not significantly
different from zero. One important exception is the negative unexplained component for the interaction of
the Licensing and Self-employed dummies, which accounts for -0.5 percentage points (-3%) of the wage
gap. This result captures the fact that self-employed licensed women earn significantly more than self-
employed unlicensed women, which cancels the gap for licensed self-employed workers (see Figure 2 and
Table B.2). Hence, the decomposition indicates that licensing significantly reduces the unexplained com-
ponent or wage structure effect. Overall, the role of licensing in explaining the wage gap is ambiguous,
5For licensing, the explained component of 0.002 is the share of licensed among men and women, 0.171-0.14, times the co-
efficient, 0.62, from the pooled regression, ignoring the interaction. The unexplained component is obtained as 0.14× (0.062+
0.006−0.052)−0.171× (.062−0.052).
6Unionization has a positive effect on wages and women are, on average, slightly more often union members than men. Without
this unionization advantage of women, they would be even worse off and, hence, the overall wage gap would increase.
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although in our estimates the negative wage structure effect dominates the positive effect on the explained
component, leading to a negative total effect of -0.2 percentage points.
4.3 Quantile regressions and quantile decomposition
In this section, we investigate how the gender wage gap and the explanatory power of covariates in wage
regressions vary over the wage distribution. We estimate model (1) using quantile regressions (Koenker and
Bassett 1978) and report the estimated coeffcients in Table 3.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, our main findings from wage regressions hold throughout the wage distribution. Still, some in-
teresting results emerge. First, the licensing premium increases moving towards higher quantiles in the wage
distribution. Second, a similar effect occurs for the certification premium, while unionization is associated
with higher wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. Third, the large wage increase associated with
female self-employed licensed workers in wage regressions is apparent throughout the wage distribution,
possibly slightly larger at lower quantiles.
We also decompose the gender wage gap over the wage distribution using the method developed in
(Chernozhukov et al. 2013). This extends the decomposition of the average gender gap (Section 4.2) to dif-
ferent quantiles of the wage distribution. The quantile decomposition is based on a counterfactual wage
distribution that is constructed by asking what the distribution of wages for females would be if the condi-
tional distribution of wages was the same as that estimated for males. Any differences from the fitted wage
distribution of males resulting from the covariates of females is attributed to the explained component or
composition effect. Analogous to the case of the decomposition of the mean, the remaining differences due
to differences in the wage functions conditional on characteristics constitute the unexplained component or
wage structure effect.
The unconditional distribution of log wages FWM,M with the male wage function and the male character-










where FWM,F is the counterfactual wage distribution that women would face if they were compensated
according to the male wage function. Given a distribution of male wages conditional on their characteristics
FWM|XM , where FXM is the distribution of male characteristics, the unconditional distribution of log wages with
the male wage function and the male characteristics can be computed. The first term in equation (3) then
10
gives the effect of differing distributions of characteristics, while the second term shows the unexplained
component or wage structure effect.7
We estimate quantile functions for the 10th through the 90th percentile. As before, the dependent vari-
able is log hourly wage including control variables for employment status, labour market institution, their
interaction with employment status, education, age, its square, firm size, indicators for occupation, coun-
try, and industry. 95% confidence intervals are based on bootstrapped standard errors obtained with 100
replications.8
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The quantile decomposition provides some new insights. Figure 3a shows the wage gap (sum of both
components) measured at different quantiles of the wage distribution in comparison to the average wage
gap from the Oaxaca-Blinder procedure (along with Eicker-Huber-White 95% confidence intervals). It is
apparent that the gender wage gap varies between 20% and 14% over the wage distribution, a variation that
cannot be captured by the mean decomposition.
Figure 3b compares the explained and unexplained components of the gender wage gap at different
quantiles of the wage distribution. As in the mean decomposition, most of the difference is attributed to the
unexplained component. Although covariates explain little of the wage gap on average, they explain about -
0.05 percentage points at the bottom and 0.05 at the top of the wage distribution. Hence, the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition masks some of the explanatory power of the covariates. The larger explained component at
the top of the wage distribution is consistent with a lower representation of women in highly paid occupa-
tions and differences in individual characteristics required in highly paid jobs.
The quantile decomposition is consistent with our previous results from mean decompositions and quan-
tile regressions. For example, the quantile regression results for the median in Table 3 imply a predicted
wage gap of 0.136. This corresponds to the unexplained component at the median resulting from the quantile
decomposition desribed in Figure 3 (also about 0.13).
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates a detailed decomposition of the explained component of the gender wage gap.
The model includes the same covariates as in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition arranged in three groups
7To illustrate how the counterfactual distribution is constructed, consider the unconditional distribution of wages (w) as the
integral of the wage distribution conditional on characteristics x. Then FWM,M(w) =
∫
FWM|XM(w|x)dFXM(x) and FWF,F(w) is obtained




8The estimation method is different from quantile regressions in that proportions, not quantiles, are estimated and then inverted
globally back to quantiles, i.e. using the entire distribution and not only a single quantile. The conditional quantile function is
monotonized using the re-arrangement method suggested by Chernozhukov et al. (2010). This allows to invert the quantile function
to obtain the conditional distribution function.
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to ease exposition. The first (licensing) includes the licensing dummies and its interactions, the second
(certification and unionization) includes the dummies for the other two institutions and their interactions,
and the third includes all the remaining covariates (individual characteristics and fixed effects).
In Section 4.2 we showed that the different prevalence of licensing among men and women explains
part of the mean wage gender gap. Figure 4 qualifies this result by showing that the positive explained
component at the mean is the result of a larger explained component at the bottom than at the top of the
wage distribution. The second group of covariates (certification and unionization) also explains more of the
wage gap at the bottom than at the top of the wage distribution. Finally, individual characteristics and fixed
effects (for occupation, industry, and country) explain a growing proportion of the wage gap as we move
towards higher quantiles of the wage distribution. This large heterogeneity across quantiles of the wage
distribution cannot be captured by the decomposition at the mean.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
4.4 The Gender Hour Gap
To understand how the different labor market institutions work, it is interesting to study the gender hour gap.
For example, if the closure of the gender wage gap for self-employed, licensed women was accompanied
by a similar change in hours, then the gender gap in income would be closed as well. It is also interesting
to ask whether the premia on wages gained through certification and union membership are associated with
more hours of work. To this end, we estimate an OLS hours regression similar to the wage regression used
above.





















+ ϑo +ϑn +ϑc +uionc
where the dependent variable Hoursionc denotes monthly hours worked by individual i, in occupation
o, industry n, and country c. The regressors Xionc are identical to those in equation (1). uionc captures
unobserved factors in the error term.
Figure 5 shows the predicted gender hour gap for employees (left-hand graph) and the self-employed
(right hand graph), while the estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.3.
12
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Female employees who are not associated to any of the three institutions work on average 14 hours per
month less than men (after controlling for individual characteristics and fixed effects). Differences across
institutions are rather small. Relative to unregulated workers, the gap increases for licensed and certified
employees by 3.6 and 2.7 hours per month respectively, while it decreases by 2.6 hours per month for union
members. Differences in the gender hour gap are also relatively small in the right hand side graph, which
shows gender gaps for self-employed workers. Interestingly, the canceling of the wage gap for licensed
self-employed woman (described in Section 4.1) does not translate into a reduction in the gender hour gap.
Table B.3 shows that the licensing premium and the self-employment premium (documented in the
wage regressions) are associated with longer working hours (4.6 and 12 hours respectively in column IX).9
Also certification, and to a lesser extent unionization, are associated with longer hours (4.2 and 2.1 hours),
reflecting the higher wage observed for these workers in wage regressions. However, the higher wages for
self-employed licensed women observed in wage regressions do not correspond to longer working hours.
The coefficient for the interaction of the Female, Self-employed, and Licensing dummies is not significantly
different from zero (the point estimate is -1.87 with a standard error of 6.29).
5. Robustness checks
Our main finding from Section 4 suggests a large wage premium for self-employed licensed women. To
corroborate the reliability of this result, we described earlier the set of different techniques employed (OLS
regressions, quantile regressions, counterfactual distribution regressions) to estimate different specifications.
As a further check of whether our main finding survives when using very different data from that of the EU-
SOR, we replicate our estimations using datasets commonly used for studying labour markets. Since to
our knowledge no dataset provides a self-reported measure on licensing and certification for the EU and
classification of licensing on the occupational level is not readily available, we use two countries repre-
senting different styles of occupational regulation (of English and German legal origin, see Pagliero 2019):
Germany and the UK.
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GER-SOEP), provides detailed information on all the variables of
interest (see Wagner et al. 2007), with the exception of whether licensing is legally required to work. We
address this by compiling a database of more than 250 licensed 4-digit occupations using information from
Rostam-Afschar (2015), the German Federal Employment Agency and the European Commission database
on regulated professions. We use all of the annual waves from 1984 through 2018 and assign for our
estimations to each occupation code a binary indicator for being licensed. For the UK, we pool comparable
9The fact that self-employed work longer hours been attributed to precautionary labor supply (Jessen et al. 2018).
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cross-sections from the 1992, 2001, 2006, and 2012 iterations of the Skills and Employment Survey (UK-
SES) (see Felstead et al. 2014). As with the SOEP, the survey has no information on the regulation status
of the respondent. We address this using the UK Database of Regulated Occupations (Koumenta et al.
2014), a hand-collected database put together through desk research on the regulatory status of the 353
4-digit occupation unit groups defined by the UK Office for National Statistics’ Standard Occupational
Classification system (SOC 2000).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
We estimate the same model specifications for both wages and hours as before (see Section 4.1), with the
exception of certification, which is not available in the UK-SES and the GER-SOEP data. We then include
further variables not available in the EU-SOR, particularly indicator variables for the presence of dependent
children, in a step-wise fashion.
Table 4 presents the main findings from our sensitivity checks (the full set of results is reported in Table
B.4). Both in the UK-SES and the GER-SOEP, the large wage effect for self-employed licensed women
is present. The coefficients are of similar size and statistically indistinguishable from each other. The
gender wage gaps in the UK and Germany are somewhat larger than the EU average (which is reported for
comparison in column 1). This might be due to the focus on the more recent period of observation of the
EU-SOR.
Comparing the results from hour regressions (columns 4-6), we find that women work about 10 fewer
hours per month than men in the UK, and 40 hours less in Germany, and in line with existing research
(again recall the different periods of observations). Our results from the EU-SOR (column 4) are somewhat
in between. There is a similar ordering of the estimated coefficients for the interaction of Female, Self-
Employed, and Licensed dummies, although they are not significantly different from zero. Even though self-
employed licensed women have a significantly higher wage, they do not respond by working more hours.
We conclude that our results are not sensitive to the specificities of any of our datasets or the methodology
used for measuring occupational licensing.
5.1 Selection
The decision to become self-employed may be determined by characteristics such as ability, preference for
locus of control, or attitudes towards risk unobserved in our dataset. This can be accounted for econometri-
cally with methods like the Heckman (1979) selection correction for the conditional expectation and similar
techniques for quantile regressions. We follow the approach of Biewen et al. (2020) who extend the Buchin-
sky (1998, 2001) control function method to correct for selection of females into full-time employment. In
contrast, we model selection into self-employment. We include Z, a vector of the standard control variables
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described above plus a set of additional variables assumed to influence selection into self-employment in
this first stage regression. Our choice of the exclusion restriction is similar to those of the literature (Biewen
et al. 2020): We include regional unemployment rates obtained from Eurostat (at NUTS1 or NUTS2-level,
as recorded in the survey). The variable regional unemployment is an indicator for the tightness of the local
labor market.
Consider two groups of workers. The first (All) includes all workers, the second (SE) only comprises
self-employed workers. The conditional wage quantiles in the entire population can then be written as
Qτ(yAll|XAll) = X ′AllχAll,τ +hτ(Z′SEµ),
where Qτ(yAll|XAll) denotes the τ-quantile of the distribution of potential log wages yAll for workers
with characteristics XAll. This is the distribution of wages a randomly-drawn worker with characteristics
XAll would face if she decided to be self-employed. The vector χAll,τ represents the quantile-specific co-
efficients for this distribution of potential wages. Since not all workers actually work in self-employment,
we can only use the wages of workers who indicate to be self-employed, which implies a non-randomly
selected subpopulation. To correct for this selection problem, we include the selection correction term
hτ(Z′SEµ) at each quantile, where Z
′
SE is a vector of individual characteristics explaining participation in
self-employment. Participation in self-employment (cf. Rostam-Afschar 2014) is described as follows:
Pr(SE = 1|Z) = Pr(Z′µ +ν > 0|Z), (5)
where µ is a vector of parameters and ν is an error term of the selection equation, possibly correlated
with the error term in the quantile wage regressions.
[FIGURE C.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure C.1 presents visual evidence for our selection model for female participation in self-employment.
Table C.5 reports the coefficient estimates. Column I displays the probit coefficients and column II the
average marginal effects. There is a gender gap with respect to participation in self-employment. Women
are less likely to be self-employed by 4.0 percentage points. The probability to be in self-employment is 5.6
percentage points higher for licensed workers, and 12.6 percentage points lower for union members. The
coefficient of regional unemployment (the instrument in the selection model) is significantly different from
zero.10
10The Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) F-test rejects that the first stage is weakly identified (F-Statistic 10.59, p-value 0.001).
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Analogous to the Heckman (1979) approach for the conditional expectation, the selection correction
term ĥτ at quantile τ involves the inverse Mills ratio. Following (Newey 2009), we approximate the selection
correction term from a prediction of the first-stage regression (5) using a power series with parameters π ,







where λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio.11
[TABLE D.6 ABOUT HERE]
Table D.6 reports the quantile regression results. For comparison, the last column shows the estimates
of the two-step Heckman selection correction (Heckit) for the conditional expectation. Overall, the results
are in line with previous results, showing a closing of the wage gap for self-employed workers. However,
while there is complete canceling of the gap at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution, the closure of
the gap is only partial in the middle of the wage distribution, where selection seems to play a larger role.12
6. Conclusion
Although our results are descriptive and do not capture causal effects, they show that occupational licens-
ing has a potentially significant impact on the gender wage gap, possibly in conjunction with other variables
capturing labor market regulations, institutions, and type of work arrangements (self-employed versus em-
ployees) and in different ways across the wage distribution. In particular, we showed that the gender wage
gap disappears for the licensed self-employed. This is a new fact about gender gaps, and one that is quite
robust to a number of estimation techniques and the use of different data sets.
Understanding the channel through which licensing might affect the gender gap is beyond the objec-
tives of this paper. The canceling of the wage gap for licensed self-employed workers might be related to
11As pointed out by Huber and Melly (2015), the error terms of the wage equation cannot be heteroscedastic in Z but only in the
determinants of selection to self-employment Z′SE. In order to estimate a model that does not rely on this restrictive assumption,
we follow Biewen et al. (2020) and transform our model by dividing the wage equation by η(Z′SE,Z
′
SEµ). This scaling factor is
based on two quantiles α1 = 0.15 and α2 = 0.85 from which we calculate the interquantile spread for self-employed women with
characteristics ZSE∆q(ZSE) = Q(α2)(ySE|ZSE)−Q(α1)(ySE|ZSE), where Qτ (ySE|ZSE) denotes the τ-quantile of the distribution
of potential log wages ySE for workers with characteristics ZSE. Then, assuming a standard normally distributed unobservable




−1(α2)−Φ−1(α1). The ratio of these two spreads η(ZSE,Z′SEµ) = ∆q(ZSE)/∆ν(Z
′
SEµ)
gives the factor by which we scale all variables in the wage equation.
12The selectivity-corrected results can be contrasted with those of Table D.7, which shows the uncorrected results estimated on
the sample of self-employed individuals.
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the signaling effect of licensing, which corrects for the asymmetric information of consumers. This type of
explanation would require that consumers react to licensing differently from employers, who would not be
induced to abandon statistical discrimination even in the presence of licensing. However, other explanations
are possible (mainly based on selection into licensed professions and self-employment). These would gener-
ally require some sort of bias in the licensing process (or differential cost of licensing) that positively selects
women simultaneously into licensed professions and self-employment. Exploring these possible mecha-
nisms might provide new insights into the relation between regulations, institutions, and gender differences.
Another interesting fact that we document in this paper is that the absence of the wage gap for the
licensed self-employed is not mirrored by a significant reduction in the gender gap in hours worked. This
could be due to preferences of women for flexibility, or social and family constraints that limit their labor
supply response. Overall, our work suggests that the interaction of occupational licensing regulations with
labor supply decisions might be an interesting area for future research.
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Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Gap t-stat.
Hourly wage (Euro) 9.82 8.65 11.27 8.58 -1.45*** -6.28
Monthly hours (h) 144.41 45.07 167.77 33.53 -23.36*** -24.1
%-Share of
Self-Employed 0.11 0.18 -0.07*** -9.08
Employee 0.89 0.82 0.07*** 9.08
Licensed 0.21 0.22 -0.00 -0.42
Certified 0.19 0.22 -0.03*** -3.21
Unionised 0.25 0.23 0.02** 2.01
Observations 11,981 11,032
Notes: The table reports averages and standard deviations for the main variables used in the analysis by
gender. The last two columns report results of t-tests on the gender differences between means. Figures
are weighted by survey weights provided by the EU-SOR. Individuals with missing information on any of
the variables reported in the table are excluded. Definitions of licensed, certified, certified, and unionized
are described in Table A.1 and Appendix E. Significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE 2
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender wage gap
I II III IV
Predicted log wage 1.963*** 1.963*** 1.963*** 1.963***
of males (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Predicted log wage 1.797*** 1.797*** 1.797*** 1.797***
of females (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Difference 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Expl. Unexpl. Expl. Unexpl. Expl. Unexpl. Expl. Unexpl.
Licensed -0.002∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Licensed × Self-Employed 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 -0.005∗∗ 0.001 -0.005∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Certified 0.001∗ -0.002
(0.000) (0.003)




Unionisation × Self-Employed -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Self-Employed 0.004 0.010 -0.007∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.005∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
Individual controls -0.016∗∗∗ 0.074 -0.016∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.003) (0.112) (0.003) (0.113)
Occupation FE -0.010∗∗ 0.014 -0.011∗∗ 0.013
(0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.025)
Country FE 0.024∗ -0.053 0.024∗ -0.053
(0.011) (0.044) (0.011) (0.044)
Industry FE 0.013∗∗∗ 0.023 0.014∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.003) (0.058) (0.003) (0.058)
Constant 0.201∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.099 0.096
(0.016) (0.017) (0.136) (0.136)
Total -0.002** 0.168*** 0.003 0.163*** 0.006 0.160*** 0.007 0.159***
(0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
Observations 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734
Estimation: OLS Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.
Sample: Full sample. Decomposition is expressed from the viewpoint of females in contrast to males.
Control variables: Self-employment dummy, labour market institution dummies and their interaction with self-employment dummy,
individual controls (education, age, age2, firm size dummies), indicators for occupation, country, and industry. The table reports the
sum of individual contributions for four groups of variables (individual characteristics, occupation fixed effects, country fixed effects,
and industry fixed effects).
Inference: Robust standard errors obtained with the Delta method are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE 3
Quantile regressions of log hourly wages
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Quantile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Dependent variable Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Female -0.110*** -0.131*** -0.141*** -0.147*** -0.158*** -0.171*** -0.163*** -0.166*** -0.193***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
Licensing 0.035 0.037* 0.047** 0.044** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.070**
(0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.033)
Female × Licensing 0.009 0.022 0.014 0.008 -0.041* -0.034 -0.032 -0.032 0.004
(0.038) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.033) (0.046)
Certification 0.032 0.040** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.047** 0.064*** 0.061** 0.055*
(0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.033)
Female × Certification -0.025 -0.022 -0.005 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 -0.038 -0.047 0.005
(0.038) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.033) (0.045)
Unionisation 0.029 0.024 0.028* 0.013 0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.015 -0.040
(0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.030)
Female × Unionisation 0.023 0.040* 0.039* 0.038* 0.051** 0.057*** 0.049** 0.055** 0.072*
(0.031) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038)
Self-Employment -0.072 -0.036 0.056 0.088** 0.109*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.353*** 0.357***
(0.057) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.050) (0.068)
Female × Self-Employment -0.265*** -0.143*** -0.128*** -0.076** -0.015 0.007 -0.010 -0.047 -0.101*
(0.050) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.060)
Self-Employment × Licensing -0.063 -0.017 -0.029 0.005 -0.035 -0.059 -0.061 -0.109** -0.022
(0.061) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.053) (0.072)
Female × Licensing 0.425*** 0.203*** 0.240*** 0.227*** 0.197*** 0.152** 0.205*** 0.241*** 0.091
× Self-Employed (0.098) (0.068) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.085) (0.117)
Self-Employment × Certification -0.034 -0.050 0.020 0.023 0.095** 0.066 0.047 -0.017 -0.068
(0.064) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.056) (0.077)
Female × Certification 0.120 -0.082 -0.107 -0.142** -0.135* -0.170** -0.087 -0.075 -0.074
× Self-Employed (0.108) (0.075) (0.072) (0.068) (0.070) (0.072) (0.079) (0.094) (0.129)
Self-Employment × Union -0.325*** -0.261*** -0.139** -0.210*** -0.152*** -0.108* -0.034 -0.091 -0.102
(0.090) (0.062) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.065) (0.078) (0.108)
Female × Union -0.062 0.173 0.070 0.143 0.074 0.023 -0.144 -0.082 -0.138
× Self-Employed (0.159) (0.110) (0.106) (0.101) (0.103) (0.106) (0.116) (0.138) (0.190)
Constant 0.701*** 0.996*** 1.349*** 1.469*** 1.608*** 1.768*** 1.921*** 2.110*** 2.354***
(0.097) (0.067) (0.065) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.084) (0.116)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occupation FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734
Estimation: Quantile regressions.
Sample: Full sample.
Dependent variable: Log net hourly wage.
Individual Controls: Education dummies, age, its square, firm size dummies.
Inference: Standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE 4
Comparison of wage and hour regressions for EU, UK and German samples
Dependent variable Log Wages Hours
I II III IV V VI
Sample EU-SOR UK-SES GER-SOEP EU-SOR UK-SES GER-SOEP
Female -0.164*** -0.232*** -0.209*** -14.017*** -10.359*** -39.708***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (2.000) (0.400) (1.985)
Female × Self-Employed × Licensed 0.228*** 0.259 0.265*** -1.870 -6.203 -0.495
(0.069) (0.209) (0.067) (6.290) (3.978) (4.214)
Estimation: OLS regressions. Columns 1 and and 3 (EU-SOR) report results from Table B.2 and B.3 for comparison. Table B.4
reports the full table of results for the UK and German samples.
Dependent variable: Log net hourly wage or hours worked (monthly).
Control variables: Self-employment dummy, labour market institution dummies (except certification) and their interaction
with self-employment dummies, indicators for kids of ages 0-4, 5-15, education dummies, age, its square, firm size dummies,
indicators for occupation, country, and industry.
Inference: Standard errors (clustered by federal state in the German sample and by region and survey wave in the UK) are in
parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on data for the UK from the Skills and Employment Survey (UK-SES), for Germany from the
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Notes: The figure shows weighted kernel density estimates of log hourly wages for the self-employed (solid)
and employees (dashed) by gender and licensing status. Estimates have been obtained using the Gaussian kernel
function. Predicted mean wage for the self-employed (solid) and employees (dashed) and 95% confidence inter-
vals are plotted as vertical lines and shaded areas, respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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FIGURE 2











































Notes: This figure is based on results from wage regressions (2). Estimation coefficients are reported in Table
B.2, column IX. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors obtained with the Delta-method.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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FIGURE 3
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(b) Explained (bottom) and unexplained (top) component of wage gap
Notes: The figures are based on 81 quantile functions (with 100 quantile regressions each) from the 10th to the
90th percentile, with dependent variable log hourly wage, including control variables for employment status,
labour market institution, their interaction with employment status, education age, its square, firm size, indica-
tors for occupation, country, and industry. 95% confidence intervals are based on bootstrapped standard errors
obtained with 100 replications. The dashed and dotted lines indicates the conditional expectation of the gender
gap and its Eicker-Huber-White 95% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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FIGURE 4
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Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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FIGURE 5











































Notes: The figure is based on results from hour regressions (4). Estimation coefficients are reported in Table
B.3, column IX. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors obtained with the Delta-method.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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Appendix
A Details on Key Variables in the EU-SOR
TABLE A.1
Definition of key variables
Variable Definition
Female Indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reported being female.
Licensing Indicator variable based on the question: ‘In addition to this education, do you have a professional certifica-
tion, license or did you have to take an exam which is required to practice your occupation?’ and ‘Without
this professional certification, license or exam would you be legally allowed to practice your occupation?’.
An individual is classified as ‘licensed’ if she answers ‘Yes’ to the first question and ‘No’ to the second.
We exclude a small number of licensed workers who are in the process of obtaining their qualification and
those indicating being both licensed and union members.
Certification A worker is classified as ‘certified’ if she answers ‘Yes’ to the first question and ‘Yes’ or ‘Don’t know/No
answer’ to the second question. We exclude a small number of certified workers who are in the process of
obtaining their qualification and those indicating being both certified and union members.
Unionisation Indicator variable equal to one if respondent reports to be member of a trade union.
Self-Employed Indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reported working as self-employed
Education Set of indicator variables for six classes of highest level of respondent’s education. Classes are primary
education, lower secondary education, upper secondary education, post-secondary education, university,
post-graduate/PhD.
Age Respondent’s reported age.
Firm size Set of indicators for four classes of the number of full and part time workers at firm or organization where
the respondent is working. Classes are < 10,10−15,51−250,> 250.
Occupation Indicators for 1-digit ISCO classification.
Industry Indicators for 1-digit NACE classification of the industry in which the firm or organization of the worker
operates.
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B Additional Results for the Conditional Expectations
TABLE B.2
Results from wage regressions
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Dependent variable Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Female -0.181*** -0.177*** -0.167*** -0.160*** -0.155*** -0.179*** -0.177*** -0.169*** -0.164***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Licensing 0.041** 0.044** 0.042** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Female × Licensing 0.006 0.024 0.025 -0.006
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Certification 0.038** 0.042** 0.043** 0.040**
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Female × Certification -0.040* -0.017 -0.018 -0.007
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022)
Union -0.037** -0.021 -0.016 -0.006
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Female × Union 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.067***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Self-employed 0.156*** 0.171***
(0.049) (0.051)
Female × Self-employed -0.084**
(0.039)
Self-employed × Licensing -0.046
(0.058)
Female × Self-employed × Licensing 0.228***
(0.069)
Self-employed × Certification 0.016
(0.048)
Female × Self-employed × Certification -0.109
(0.105)
Self-employed × Unionisation -0.130
(0.081)
Female × Self-employed × Unionisation 0.026
(0.189)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734 13,734
R-squared 0.737 0.754 0.758 0.761 0.760 0.761 0.761 0.762 0.762
Estimation: OLS regressions.
Sample: Full sample.
Control variables: Self-employment dummy, labour market institution dummies and their interaction with self-employment dummy, individual
controls (education, age, age2, firm size dummies), indicators for occupation, country, and industry.
Inference: Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE B.3
Results from hour regressions
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Dependent variable Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
Female -20.444*** -17.853*** -15.820*** -14.569*** -14.936*** -16.148*** -14.828*** -14.021*** -14.017***
(2.361) (2.209) (2.019) (1.808) (1.870) (2.140) (1.844) (1.981) (2.000)
Licensing 4.224*** 5.211*** 5.044*** 4.618***
(1.387) (1.576) (1.586) (1.536)
Female × Licensing -4.581** -4.182* -4.100* -3.650
(1.970) (2.084) (2.114) (2.243)
Certification 2.365* 3.653** 3.618** 4.194**
(1.177) (1.394) (1.392) (1.582)
Female × Certification -2.201 -2.292 -2.304 -2.762
(2.384) (2.596) (2.593) (2.583)
Union 0.011 1.693 2.153* 2.134*
(1.102) (1.014) (1.124) (1.113)
Female × Union 4.546** 3.230 2.617 2.636
(2.175) (1.909) (1.986) (1.942)
Self-employed 11.885*** 11.980***
(3.448) (3.540)
Female × Self-employed -4.346* -4.282
(2.458) (3.008)
Self-employed × Licensing 1.678
(3.361)
Female × Self-employed × Licensing -1.870
(6.290)
Self-employed × Certification -2.577
(2.379)
Female × Self-employed × Certification 1.650
(4.633)
Self-employed × Unionisation 0.424
(3.236)
Female × Self-employed × Unionisation 0.121
(8.621)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occupation FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688 19,688
R-squared 0.134 0.154 0.168 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.181 0.182 0.182
Estimation: OLS regressions.
Dependent variable: Hours worked (monthly).
Sample: Full sample.
Control variables: Self-employment dummy, labour market institution dummies and their interaction with self-employment dummy, individual controls
(education, age, age2, firm size dummies), indicators for occupation, country, and industry.
Inference: Standard errors assuming residuals are independent and identically distributed are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE B.4
Results from wage and hour regressions with UK and German data
UK-SES GER-SOEP
Log Wages Hours Log Wages Hours
Female -0.232*** -10.359*** -0.209*** -39.708***
(0.017) (0.400) (0.010) (1.985)
Self-Employed 0.071 3.235** 0.166*** 51.772***
(0.031) (0.839) (0.034) (1.912)
Female × Self-Employed -0.159** -2.585* -0.170*** -14.539***
(0.057) (1.351) (0.042) (3.973)
Licensed 0.021 2.473 0.033*** -0.487
(0.040) (1.256) (0.007) (0.681)
Female × Licensed 0.014*** -0.015 0.038** 5.358***
(0.042) (1.593) (0.013) (0.900)
Self-Employed × Licensed 0.514*** 1.287 0.051 -5.225**
(0.112) (2.116) (0.033) (2.233)
Female × Self-Employed × Licensed 0.259 -6.203 0.265*** -0.495
(0.209) (3.978) (0.067) (4.214)
Union 0.028*** -0.526 0.041*** -6.329***
(0.013) (0.320) (0.008) (0.470)
Female × Union 0.248 2.860*** -0.003 15.893***
(0.017) (0.475) (0.006) (1.561)
Selfempl × Union 0.052 1.529 0.042 -33.498***
(0.112) (2.346) (0.123) (10.976)
Female × Self-employed × Union -0.036 -0.340 -0.354 20.000
(0.161) (3.897) (0.210) (14.323)
Kids 0 to 4 years 0.134*** -1.489*** 0.133*** -8.383***
(0.013) (0.357) (0.006) (0.807)
Kids 5 to 15 years 0.055*** -2.676*** 0.049*** -9.892***
(0.357) (0.348) (0.004) (0.789)
Individual controls YES YES YES YES
Occupation controls YES YES YES YES
Country controls YES YES YES YES
Industry controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,743 15,559 66,674 66,785
R-squared 0.423 0.253 0.515 0.299
Estimation: OLS regressions.
Sample: Full sample.
Dependent variable: Log net hourly wage or hours worked (monthly).
Control variables: Self-employment dummy, labour market institution dummies (except certifi-
cation) and their interaction with self-employment dummies, indicators for kids of ages 0-4, 5-15,
education dummies, age, its square, firm size dummies, indicators for occupation, country, and
industry.
Inference: Standard errors (clustered by federal state in the German sample and by region and
survey wave in the UK) are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on data for the UK from the Skills and Employment Survey
(UK-SES) and for Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GER-SOEP).
35
C Female Participation in Self-Employment
FIGURE C.1















































Notes: This figure is based on a probit regression with indicator for self-employment as dependent variable
including control variables for education, age, its square, indicators for occupation, regional unemployment
rate, and industry. 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors obtained with the Delta-method. The
red dashed line indicates the sample proportion of self-employed without controls.






Coefficients Marginal Effects Coeff./Marginal Effects
Female -0.203*** -0.040*** -0.046***
(0.036) (0.007) (0.007)
Licensing 0.240*** 0.057*** 0.056***
(0.047) (0.012) (0.012)
Female × Licensing 0.073 0.008 0.002
(0.069) (0.015) (0.015)
Certification 0.031 0.007 0.009
(0.041) (0.009) (0.010)
Female × Certification -0.003 -0.002 -0.007
(0.059) (0.011) (0.012)
Union -0.780*** -0.121*** -0.126***
(0.063) (0.009) (0.009)
Female × Union 0.010 0.023*** 0.049***
(0.095) (0.011) (0.010)
Regional Unemployment 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual controls YES YES YES
Occupation controls YES YES YES
Industry controls YES YES YES
Observations 19,985 19,985 19,985
R-squared 0.184
Estimation: Results from Probit and OLS regressions.
Sample: Full sample.
Dependent variable: Working as self-employed (binary).
Control variables: Labour market institution, their interaction with indicator for female,
education, age, its square, indicators for occupation, industry, regional (NUTS1/NUTS2
level) unemployment rate.
Inference: Standard errors clustered at regional level (in column II obtained with Delta-
method) are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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D Additional Results on Quantile regressions
TABLE D.6
Quantile Wage Regressions (with selection correction)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Quantile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Heckit
Dependent variable Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Female -0.339*** -0.260*** -0.221*** -0.189*** -0.148*** -0.127*** -0.097** -0.136** -0.110 -0.223**
(0.076) (0.057) (0.049) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.090)
Licensing 0.001 0.070 0.069 0.018 0.048 0.022 0.026 -0.030 -0.055 -0.058
(0.082) (0.061) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.060) (0.101) (0.104)
Female × Licensing 0.391*** 0.254** 0.132 0.131 0.060 -0.010 -0.015 0.172* 0.167 0.199**
(0.137) (0.102) (0.087) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.101) (0.169) (0.084)
Certification 0.009 0.013 0.131** 0.112** 0.083 0.075 0.102* 0.101 0.224** 0.042
(0.085) (0.063) (0.054) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.062) (0.105) (0.050)
Female × Certification 0.027 0.144 -0.050 -0.094 -0.085 -0.117 -0.178* -0.166 -0.330* -0.074
(0.148) (0.110) (0.095) (0.087) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.109) (0.183) (0.123)
Unionisation -0.067 -0.041 -0.161 -0.127 -0.226** -0.128 -0.018 0.040 0.052 -0.006
(0.172) (0.129) (0.110) (0.101) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.127) (0.214) (0.276)
Female × Unionisation 0.062 0.216 0.255 0.224 0.219 0.109 0.075 0.030 -0.070 0.148
(0.300) (0.224) (0.192) (0.176) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) (0.221) (0.372) (0.177)
Inverse Mills ratio 1.843** 0.992 0.490 0.385 0.588 0.787 0.407 0.200 0.024 0.083
(0.889) (0.664) (0.568) (0.521) (0.552) (0.551) (0.553) (0.654) (1.102) (0.737)
Inverse Mills ratio Squared -0.713 -0.400 -0.225 -0.175 -0.301 -0.387 -0.273 -0.197 -0.168 -0.170
(0.594) (0.443) (0.380) (0.348) (0.369) (0.368) (0.369) (0.437) (0.736) (0.312)
Inverse Mills ratio Cubic 0.094 0.039 0.040 0.030 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.038 0.046 0.030
(0.130) (0.097) (0.083) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.096) (0.161) (0.065)
Selection Correction Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occupation controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502
Estimation: Estimates of quantile regressions model with transformation, with selectivity correction. Heckit two-step estimation.
Sample: Self-employed sample.
Dependent variable: Log net hourly wage or hours worked (monthly).
Control variables: Employment status, labour market institution, their interaction with employment status, education, age, its square, firm size, indicators for occupation, country,
and industry. Exclusion restriction is regional unemployment rate, see Table C.5.
Inference: Standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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TABLE D.7
Quantile Wage Regressions on Sample of Self-employed
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Quantile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Dependent variable Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Female -0.292*** -0.309*** -0.258*** -0.183*** -0.161*** -0.142*** -0.118** -0.143** -0.240**
(0.094) (0.065) (0.056) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) (0.058) (0.071) (0.101)
Licensing -0.012 -0.080 0.001 0.001 0.033 -0.012 -0.007 -0.056 0.012
(0.106) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.065) (0.079) (0.113)
Female × Licensing 0.296* 0.353*** 0.186* 0.199** 0.120 0.062 0.045 0.181 -0.008
(0.174) (0.120) (0.103) (0.101) (0.095) (0.099) (0.107) (0.130) (0.185)
Certification 0.006 0.009 0.023 0.089 0.083 0.058 0.081 0.075 0.056
(0.112) (0.077) (0.067) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064) (0.069) (0.084) (0.119)
Female × Certification 0.020 0.012 0.002 -0.170 -0.156 -0.173 -0.209* -0.222 -0.211
(0.193) (0.134) (0.115) (0.112) (0.106) (0.110) (0.119) (0.145) (0.206)
Unionisation -0.148 -0.108 -0.098 -0.073 -0.026 0.006 0.042 0.052 0.013
(0.170) (0.117) (0.101) (0.099) (0.093) (0.097) (0.105) (0.127) (0.181)
Female × Unionisation 0.141 0.225 0.210 0.178 0.080 -0.120 -0.142 -0.162 -0.104
(0.297) (0.205) (0.177) (0.172) (0.163) (0.169) (0.183) (0.222) (0.316)
Constant 0.839 1.435*** 1.776*** 1.829*** 2.006*** 2.156*** 2.465*** 2.790*** 3.612***
(0.516) (0.357) (0.307) (0.300) (0.284) (0.293) (0.318) (0.387) (0.550)
Selection Correction Terms NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occupation controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601
Estimation: Estimates of quantile regressions model.
Sample: Self-employed sample.
Dependent variable: Log net hourly wage or hours worked (monthly).
Control variables: Employment status, labour market institution, their interaction with employment status, education, age, its square, firm size, indica-
tors for occupation, country, and industry.
Inference: Standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the EU-SOR 2015.
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E Key Survey Questions
Two questions were asked after asking for the highest level of education in the EU-SOR to classify workers
into two groups subject to (i) licensing and (ii) certification (or accreditation):
Question: “In addition to this education, do you have a professional certification, licence or did you have
to take an exam which is required to practice your occupation?”
Instructions to interviewees: “A professional certification or licence shows you are qualified to perform a
specific job and may give you the right to enter a regulated profession or professional association.”
Instructions to interviewers: “Only include certifications or licences obtained by the respondent as an
individual. Examples include ‘licensed medical doctor’ and ‘licensed taxi driver [. . .]”’.
1. Yes
2. No – but currently in process of obtaining one
3. No
4. Don’t know/No answer
To distinguish between licensing and certification, those who answer 1. or 2. to the above question were
then asked:
Question: “Without this professional certification, licence or exam would you be legally allowed to practice
your occupation?”
Instructions to interviewers: “Refer to the respondent’s specific occupation and personal circumstances.
Refer to the current laws and regulations affecting the respondent’s occupation (current main paid job).”.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/No answer
A worker is classified as ‘licensed’ if she answers 1. in the first question and 2. in the second. A worker
is classified as ‘certified’ if she answers 1. in the first question and 1. or 3. in the second, and ‘unregulated’
otherwise.
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520 
10-2018 Alexander Gerybadze 
Simone Wiesenauer 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES ACCELERATOR: A 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR IMPROVING 








DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN FOLGEN DER 
AUTOMATISIERUNG 
INEPA 
12-2018 Martyna Marczak 
Thomas Beissinger 
COMPETITIVENESS AT THE COUNTRY-SECTOR 








AUTOMATISIERUNG, WACHSTUM UND 
UNGLEICHHEIT 
INEPA 
14-2018 Klaus Prettner 
Sebastian Seiffert 
THE SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 
 
INEPA 
15-2018 Marina Töpfer THE EFFECT OF WOMEN DIRECTORS ON 
INNOVATION ACTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE OF 
CORPORATE FIRMS 
- EVIDENCE FROM CHINA – 
 
INEF 
16-2018 Timo Walter TRADE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF A 
POTENTIAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
INEPA 
17-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON 




18-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON TRADE OVER 




19-2018 Dario Cords 
Klaus Prettner 
TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT REVISITED: 




20-2018 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Andreas Neumayer 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF OWNERSHIP INEQUALITY 




21-2018 Nadja Dwenger 
Lukas Treber 
 
SHAMING FOR TAX ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM A NEW POLICY 
520 
22-2018 Octavio Escobar 
Henning Mühlen 
THE ROLE OF FDI IN STRUCTURAL CHANGE: 





No. Author Title Inst 
    




OBESITY INEQUALITY AND THE CHANGING 
SHAPE OF THE BODYWEIGHT DISTRIBUTION IN 
CHINA 
INEPA 
25-2018 Michael Ahlheim 
Maike Becker 
Yeniley Allegue Losada 
Heike Trastl 
 
WASTED! RESOURCE RECOVERY AND WASTE 
MANAGEMENT IN CUBA 
520 
26-2018 Peter Spahn WAS WAR FALSCH AM MERKANTILISMUS? 
 
520 
27-2018 Sophie Therese Schneider NORTH_SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE 




    
01-2019 Dominik Hartmann 
Mayra Bezerra 
Beatrice Lodolo 
Flávio L. Pinheiro 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DEVELOPMENT TRAPS, 




02-2019 Sebastian Seiffert 
 
GO EAST: ON THE IMPACT OF THE 
TRANSIBERIAN RAILWAY ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN RUSSIA 
 
INEPA 
03-2019 Kristina Bogner KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS IN THE GERMAN 
BIOECONOMY: NETWORK STRUCTURE OF 
PUBLICLY FUNDED R&D NETWORKS 
 
520 
04-2019 Dominik Hartmann 
Mayra Bezerra 
Flávio L. Pinheiro 
 
IDENTIFYING SMART STRATEGIES FOR 
ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND INCLUSIVE 
GROWTH IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES. THE 
CASE OF PARAGUAY 
 
INEPA 
05-2019 Octavio Escobar 
Henning Mühlen 
 
DECOMPOSING A DECOMPOSITION: WITHIN-
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES AND THE ROLE OF 









MAPPING STRATIFICATION: THE INDUSTRY-
OCCUPATION SPACE REVEALS THE NETWORK 
STRUCTURE OF INEQUALITY 
INEPA 
07-2019 Stephan Fichtner 
Herbert Meyr 
 
BIOGAS PLANT OPTIMIZATION BY INCREASING 











DATA QUALITY AND INFORMATION LOSS IN 
STANDARDISED INTERPOLATED PATH ANALYIS 
– QUALITY MEASURES AND GUIDELINES 
NegoTrans 
09-2019 Thilo R. Huning 
Fabian Wahl 
 
THE FETTERS OF INHERITANCE? 




10-2019 Peter Spahn KEYNESIAN CAPITAL THEORY, DECLINING 
INTEREST RATES AND PERSISTING PROFITS 
 
520 
11-2019 Thorsten Proettel INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL CURRENCIES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON MONETARY 
POLICY – AN EXPLORATION OF 
IMPLICATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 
 
520 
12-2019 Franz X. Hof 
Klaus Prettner 
RELATIVE CONSUMPTION, RELATIVE WEALTH, 
AND LONG-RUN GROWTH: WHEN AND WHY IS 
THE STANDARD ANALYSIS PRONE TO 
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS? 
INEPA 
13-2019 Vadim Kufenko 
Vincent Geloso 
WHO ARE THE CHAMPIONS? INEQUALITY, 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE OLYMPICS 
 
INEPA 
14-2019 Laura-Kristin Baric 
Niels Geiger 
 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 




15-2019 Jens Grüb 
 
MERGERS AND PARTIAL TACIT COLLUSION 520 
    
01-2020 David E. Bloom 






GOING BEYOND GDP WITH A PARSIMONIOUS 
INDICATOR: INEQUALITY-ADJUSTED HEALTHY 
LIFETIME INCOME 
INEPA 
02-2020 Michael Kuhn 
Klaus Prettner 
RISING LONGEVITY, INCREASING THE 
RETIREMENT AGE, AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
FOR KNOWLEDGE-BASED LONG-RUN GROWTH 
 
520 




THE RETIREMENT MIGRATION PUZZLE IN CHINA 520 
04-2020 Andreas Orland 
Davud Rostam-Afschar 
FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS AND 








THE DEEP IMPRINT OF ROMAN 
SANDALS: EVIDENCE OF LONG-LASTING 
EFFECTS OF ROMAN RULE ON 
PERSONALITY, ECONOMIC 




06-2020 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Klaus Prettner 
Paul Tscheuschner 
THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION AND ITS ROLE IN 




07-2020 Vladan Ivanovic 
Vadim Kufenko 
IT’S A MAN’S WORLD? THE RISE OF FEMALE 











OVERCONFIDENCE AND GENDER DIFFERENCES 
IN WAGE EXPECTATIONS 
520 
09-2020 Thomas Beissinger 
Joël Hellier 
Martyna Marczak 
DIVERGENCE IN LABOUR FORCE GROWTH: 




10-2020 Benjamin Jung THE HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF CHINA‘S 




11-2020 Timo Dimitriadis 
Xiaochun Liu 
Julie Schnaitmann 
ENCOMPASSING TESTS FOR VALUE AT RISK 
AND EXPECTED SHORTFALL MULTI-STEP 




12-2020 Timo Dimitriadis 
Andrew J. Patton 
Patrick W. Schmidt 
 
TESTING FORECAST RATIONALITY FOR 
MEASURES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY 
520 
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